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Abstract 
 
Four interrelated arguments are presented to form a theory about the relation between 
the logic of markets, social efficiency and the quality of government. The first is that 
competitive markets with a certain set of characteristics are the most efficient 
organizational form for creating a utilitarian based economic efficiency for the 
production of most goods and services. The second argument is that in order to reach 
this utilitarian based social efficiency, markets need large and complicated set of 
institutions, formal as well as informal. Since such institutions will in the long run 
make all market agents better off, they are labelled efficient institutions. The third 
argument is that it is unlikely that such institutions will be created endogenously by 
market agents. Moreover, if such institutions have been created, we should expect 
market agents to try to destroy them. Based on insights from various approaches 
(institutional economics and research on neo-corporatism, clientilism, and corruption) 
there is no reason to expect that efficient institutions will evolve by any selection 
mechanism that is generated from the sum of agency that exists in markets. The 
conclusion reached is that if left to themselves, markets are inherently self-
destructive. The fourth argument is that markets can only reach social efficiency if the 
agents that reproduce the necessary efficient type of institutions act according to a 
logic that is different from the logic that market agents use when operating in the 
market. This operational logic is the ethical dimensions of what should count as 
quality of government 
 
 
 
Bo Rothstein 
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Is there such a thing like legal corruption? 
 
In his “farewell lecture” on December 9th, 2008, former leading World Bank economist Dani 
Kaufmann introduced the concept of legal corruption. The term certainly seems like an 
oxymoron, but Kaufmann motivates it by arguing for the need to redefine corruption to 
include “how elites collude and purchase, or unduly influence the rules of the game, shape the 
institutions, the policies and regulations and the laws for their own private benefits”. If this is 
done illegally, as in the traditional use of the term corruption, or legally, is according to 
Kaufmann of minor interest from the viewpoint of economic and social efficiency. The term 
“legal corruption” covers processes when public policy is thwarted or “captured” by various 
private interests instead of serving the common/public interests, thus all forms of 
“privatization of public policy”. Kaufmann’s case in point is the background to the current 
financial and economic crisis and he points out how powerful agents in the financial sector 
have used their influence to “relax regulatory oversight and capital requirements”.1 By this 
important theoretical move, Kaufmann makes it possible to connect the study of corruption to 
the analysis of special interests politics, also known as neo-corporatism. The current financial 
crisis leads according to Kaufmann to the following conclusion: “If anybody thought that the 
governance and corruption challenge was a monopoly of the developing world… that notion 
has been disposed completely”.2   
 
In this paper I will present four interrelated arguments that sum up to a theory about the 
relation between the logic of markets, social efficiency, and what has been named quality of 
government. The first, and least controversial, is that competitive markets with a certain set of 
characteristics are the most efficient organizational form of creating a utilitarian based 
economic efficiency for the production of most goods and services. Such characteristics 
include free entry, low transaction costs, reasonably good and freely available information, 
goods that are not by their very nature collective, low external effects, and efficient protection 
of property rights.3 The second argument is that in order to reach this utilitarian based (aka 
                                                 
1 Kaufmann points to a meeting held in April 2004 when the CEO:s of the (then) five big investment banks on 
Wall Street persuaded the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to relax regulation that stipulated their 
need for financial reserves. See also article in New York Times, October 3, 2008, “Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks 
Pile Up New Debt” by Stephen Labaton   
2 Kaufmann has lead the World Bank Institute’s work in on “Governance Issues” . His farewell lecture can be 
found at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/bspan/PresentationView.asp?PID=2363&EID=1056 
3 Such markets need not entail what is known as the domination of capitalist power in the relations of 
production. In a market economy, capital can hire labour which implies that capital will be more powerful than 
labour in how to organize the production process. However, labour can also hire capital (e.g., a group of 
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“pareto”, but henceforth social) efficiency, markets need a specific kind of large and 
complicated set of institutions, which are both formal as well as informal. Since such 
institutions will in the long run make all market agents better off, they can be called efficient 
institutions. The third argument is that we have little reason to expect that such institutions 
will be created endogenously by market agents. Instead, we should expect market agents to 
act in a way that either will prevent such institutions to be established, or if they are 
established, will try to destroy them. To use a metaphor from evolutionary biology, we have 
no reason to expect that efficient institutions will evolve by any selection mechanism that is 
generated from the sum of agency that operates on markets. Instead, my argument is that if 
left to themselves, markets are endogenously self-destructive. The fourth argument is that 
markets can only reach social efficiency if the agents that reproduce the necessary institutions 
act according to a logic that is different from the logic that market agents use when operating 
in the market. In short, my ambition is to make the case for the existence of a paradox in 
social organisation, namely that you can have a market about anything as long as you don’t 
have a market about everything. The need for efficient informal and formal institutions has 
recently been emphasised by institutional economists working with these problems in 
developing countries. One example among many is Dani Rodrik who writes that “the 
encounter between neo-classical economics and developing societies served to reveal the 
institutional underpinnings of market economies.” Among such institutional underpinnings 
Rodrik lists a well specified system of property rights, effective regulation that hinders 
monopolies to dominate markets, uncorrupted governments, the rule of law, and social 
welfare systems that can accommodate risks. Interestingly enough, Rodrik also mentions the 
importance of informal societal institutions that foster social cohesion, social trust and 
cooperation. He criticises neo-classical economics for omitting the importance of such 
institutions by arguing that “these are social arrangements that economists usually take for 
granted, but which are conspicuous by their absence in poor countries” (Rodrik 2007, p. 153).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
workers/professionals can start a cooperative and take loans or issue bonds on a stock market), in which case the 
employees can elect (and hold responsible) a board that employs managers. Moreover, a third party (usually a 
group of managers or an entrepreneur) can hire both labour and capital, in which case this third party will have 
most power in the production process. The common understanding in Marxist and well as non-Marxist 
understandings of the relation between power in the production process and market economy has no logical 
underpinning. See Ellerman Ellerman, David P. 1992. Property and contract in economics: The case for 
economic democracy. Oxford: Blackwell. and Rothstein Rothstein, Bo. 1992b. Social Justice and State Capacity. 
Politics & Society 20:101-126. for more on this. Contrary to Marxian thoughts, it is the nature of the hiring 
contract, not the market economy as such, that entails power in a market based production process.  
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Another example comes from Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury Secretary, Chief 
Economist of the World Bank and also former President of Harvard University. Asked to 
review the lessons of the World Bank policies for alleviating poverty in developing countries, 
he argues that “an overwhelming lesson that I think we have learned in the 1990s is… the 
transcendent importance of the quality of institutions and the closely-related questions of the 
efficacy of political administration.” (cited in Besley 2007a, p. 571). If this is the case, the 
question of how such efficient institutions can be established and maintained should be a top 
priority for the social sciences, especially if Acemoglu and Robinson are right when they state 
that “differences in economic institutions are the major source of cross-country differences in 
economic growth and prosperity”(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, p. 674). As I will argue 
below, so far the question of how such efficient institutions can be established and reproduced 
has attracted surprisingly little attention both in economics, political science and in economic 
sociology.  
 
 
Markets, Social Efficiency and Democracy 
 
The argument about the social efficiency of markets should not be understood in an absolute, 
but in a relative sense. The reason that markets can not be seen as efficient in an absolute 
sense is that market agents can not be presumed to be in possession of anything close to 
perfect information or be unboundedly rational or that transaction costs are instantaneous and 
costless (Menard and Shirley 2005). On the contrary, empirical research about how market 
agents act shows the opposite. Agents are often myopic; they rarely have perfect information; 
they make computational mistakes when calculating costs vs. benefits; even if the value/risk 
is the same they are more likely to avoid losses than opt for gains; their beliefs can often be 
manipulated; transactions have sometimes large costs, etc. (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 2006; 
Jones 1999; Loewenstein, Rabin, and Camerer 2004; Ostrom 1998). It is only in very rare 
cases that markets can be expect to reach what economists call Pareto-efficiency, because 
agents can not be expected to meet the assumptions made in the standard welfare economics 
theorem. As stated by Joseph Stiglitz,  “a closer look at those assumptions, however, suggests 
that the theorem is of limited relevance to modern industrial economics” (Stiglitz 2002, p. 43). 
My argument for markets as efficient is based on the much more mundane argument that so 
far, for most goods and services, the alternatives to democratically regulated competitive 
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markets have not delivered. Neither systems of central planning nor “market socialism” have 
lived up to expectations of creating a reasonable degree of efficiency or anything close to 
social or economic equality (Rothstein 2008; Wright 2006). For most goods and services, 
competitive markets are more efficient than known or tried alternative forms of production. 
This is also a central lesson from much of development studies (Bigsten and Fosu 2004). In 
addition, markets seem to have important advantages when it comes to innovation and in 
furthering a Schumpeterian “creative destruction” (Olson 1982). 
     
While economists deal with aggregate individual-based utilitarian efficiency, political 
scientists are engaged in understanding power and what can be considered as ways to make 
the use of political power legitimate. The standard argument from most political scientists is 
that for large groups (cities, regions, states), the best way to make power legitimate is through 
some form of electoral-representative democracy. Such a system can in many cases solve the 
problem of power for macro-decisions like tax laws or social security schemes. The reason is 
that such laws or policies are mostly universal and can be applied according to an “equality 
before the law” principle, without involving much (or any) micro-level discretion at the point 
of delivery. In other cases, research on the implementation of public policies has clearly 
shown that such micro-level discretion can not be avoided (Smith 2003).4 This problem is 
especially acute in service delivery - for example in health- or elderly care, care of disabled 
persons, but also for example in pre-schools and schools. What takes place between the public 
employee(s) that delivers the service and the citizen in such areas is problematic from a 
micro-power approach, since the citizen/client is often in a situation of dependence. These are 
situations where the electoral-representative system for making the use of public power 
legitimate reaches a limit because a) laws can not be made with the required precision to 
account for all possible variations and b) there is often a need to let professionals have 
discretion because they have the knowledge that is needed for how to handle different 
situations/cases (Rothstein 2009). From this perspective, a right for the citizen to “exit” and 
opt for another service provider is likely to increase his or her power, either directly by 
actually exiting or by the fact that the service providing organization anticipates that the 
citizen/client may exit and that such an exit will carry losses for the organization (Besley and 
                                                 
4 The legendary Swedish Trade Union Economist Gösta Rehn made the same kind of argument in the late 1940s 
for power relations in the labour market. According to Rehn, workers’ influence in their workplaces would 
increase if they were in high demand and thereby easily could find new jobs Milner, Henry, and Eskil Wadensjö, 
eds. 2001. Gösta Rehn, the Swedish model and labour market policies : international and national perspectives. 
Aldershot: Ashgate..  
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Ghatak 2007). This will of course happen if the service in question is provided on a “pure” 
market system where the client pays directly for the service. However, the same effect can 
apply if the service is provided by the government and paid for by taxes by using some form 
of voucher system. Such a system may, as is the case with pure markets, give the service 
providing organization (e.g., the nursing home or the pre-school) an incentive to improve the 
service production and thus increase the overall efficiency of the policy in question. Thus, 
markets could be favoured not only from an efficiency point of view, but also from a “making 
power legitimate” point of view (Besley and Ghatak 2007; Blomqvist and Rothstein 2000; 
Rothstein 1998).   
 
 
Institutions – the two main types and the two main forms 
 
According to the “New Institutional Economics” (henceforth NIE), “institutions are the 
written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty 
and control the environment.” (Menard and Shirley 2005, p.1). The implication of such a 
broad definition is that institutions can come in many forms  - from constitutional laws to 
what has become known as “standard operating procedures” (Hall 1986)  or “work rules” 
(Ostrom 1990), which are known and generally agreed upon rules but that are unwritten. The 
idea that institutions include not only formal but also informal rules means that it is difficult 
to distinguish them from a society’s basic cultural traits. From a policy perspective this is 
problematic because, while it is possible to change written rules and “standard operating 
procedures/work rules” through for example a democratic process, this is much more difficult 
with things like “shared mental models” (Denzau and North 1994) and other such generally 
held basic beliefs which are rooted in a society’s historically established culture (Rothstein 
1996). In any case, as a first distinction, we can differentiate between two basic forms of 
institutions, namely formal and informal.  
 
Institutions can of course have many functions and roles. George Tsebelis has made a 
valuable distinction between “redistributive” and “efficient” institutions (Tsebelis 1990). The 
former is simply a rule that moves resources or power from one group of agents to another. A 
familiar example of such a formal redistributive institution would be most social insurance- 
and tax systems. Informal redistributive institutions would be systems known as tribalism, 
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clan-based societies and societies characterized by what has been termed “amoral familism” 
(Banfield 1958). In such societies, economic agents are reluctant to deal with agents outside 
their clan, tribe or extended family because they distrust such agents. On the other hand, they 
would give favourable treatments to agents within this type of circle. Other normatively more 
problematic examples of redistributive institutions are the type of extortion used by organized 
crime against small- and medium sized businesses (Varese 2001).   
 
The existence of redistributive institutions is in general not difficult to explain using standard 
assumptions about the consequences of the allocation of various power resources in a society. 
For example, variation in the extension and coverage of different social insurance systems has 
been explained by the variation in class-based power resources (Korpi and Palme 2003). One 
can generally expect that those with lots of power resources will establish institutions that 
make it easier to dominate those that have fewer resources. As I will argue below, we should 
expect market agents with lots of resources to try to establish institutions that will limit the 
possibilities for competition from other agents in their market with fewer resources. There are, 
however, also instances when social norms about decency and appropriateness play a role 
(Elster 1991; March and Olsen 1989). One example is the strengthening of legal norms in 
many Western countries about how to treat and take care of animals. However, the general 
assumption here is that market agents, when trying to establish or change institutions, will act 
according to a “logic of exchange” and maximize their material gains.  
    
Efficient institutions, on the other hand, have quite the opposite character since their effect is 
to improve the welfare of all actors in a specific system of exchange. As such, they are 
genuine collective (or public) goods and therefore, as will be discussed further below, difficult 
to explain from standard assumptions about human behaviour in economics. Seen in the light 
of non-cooperative game theory, these are institutions that make it possible to avoid situations 
such as sub-optimal outcomes in n-persons prisoners’ dilemma type of games. In the closely 
related social dilemma theory, efficient institutions make it possible for agents to avoid 
ending up in situations known as social traps. Such formal efficient institutions have also been 
described as “universal” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Rothstein 2005) or “impartial” (Rothstein 
and Teorell 2008) or “open access orders” (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2006).5 For market 
                                                 
5 Eggertsson (2005) differentiates between “imperfect” and not so imperfect institutions. The problem is that he 
operates with a functionalist definition of what should count as such “imperfect institutions”, namely those 
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agents, this would be institutions that secure property rights, that produce reliable information 
about the solvency and credit record of firms, as well as an un-corrupt and impartial judiciary, 
a state government operating by the “rule of law” principles, and anti-trust legislation that can 
secure “fair competition” by ruling out cartels or other forms of blockades against new agents 
entering the market. For most citizens, an honest, impartial and reasonably efficient public 
administration would also be counted into this category of efficient institutions. On the labour 
market, this can be general agreements between trade unions and employers’ federations that 
facilitate the possibilities of solving wage negotiations without having to resort to costly open 
conflicts.6   
 
The most well-known example of informal efficient institutions is when generalized trust and 
social capital are widespread in the population. Institutions like this increase the likelihood 
that other market agents will not use opportunistic or treacherous strategies but instead follow 
contracts in a benevolent way. Generalized trust and other forms of social capital thereby 
decrease transaction costs (Keefer and Knack 2005; Svendsen and Svendsen 2004)  
Theoretically, what efficient institutions do is to increase the likelihood that agents that are 
exchanging values will trust that the other agents will not behave in a treacherous way (Levi 
1998; Levi 2006). Thus, efficient institutions induce change in agents’ choice of strategy by 
increasing the likelihood that most agents will believe that most other agents cooperate 
honestly, which in turn will make it more rational for the individual agent to behave honestly. 
It should be added that the distinction between “efficient” and “redistributive” institutions is a 
theoretical ideal-type construct. In real life, many efficient institutions have some 
redistributive effects and vice versa (Tsebelis 1990). However, for the sake of theoretical 
simplifications, we will distinguish between these two types of institutions (redistributive and 
effective) and forms of institutions (informal and formal). If the two institutional forms and 
the two institutional types we have identified are cross-tabulated, the following typology and 
examples come out.  
                                                                                                                                                        
institutions “that cause relative economic backwardness” (p. 47). Such functionalist definitions should be 
avoided since they tend to become tautological, see Rothstein & Teorell (2008).    
6 Elsewhere I have argued that the famous so called Saltsjöbadsagreement that was established in Sweden in 
1936 can be seen as such an efficient type of institutions (Rothstein 2005, ch. 8). It should be underlined that in 
the European context, Sweden and the other Nordic countries were exceptions and that in most countries, the 
labour market parties failed to establish similar efficient agreements. In many cases (Italy, Spain, Germany, 
Austria), the consequences for these failures were devastating.  
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Figure 1. Institutional forms and types: Examples 
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It should be added that these forms and types empirically are strongly correlated. For 
example, high levels of corruption correlates with low levels of generalized trust, and high 
levels of “rule of law” correlates with high levels of generalized trust (Rothstein and Stolle 
2008; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). However, while correlations are strong between formal 
and informal institutions in both cases, how the causality works between them is a very 
complicated and mostly unresolved matter.  The most plausible explanation is that formal and 
informal efficient institutions are mutually re-enforcing entities in which causality operates 
with lots of feedback mechanisms over time. A good example of this is the analysis by Farrell 
and Knight of how firms in a certain district in Northern Italy use trust-based collaboration to 
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strengthen their market position as a collective, while also being competitors in the very same 
market segment. What they show is that the formal efficient types of institutions work, so to 
say, behind the scene as a last resort possibility for agents to deal with 
opportunistic/treacherous behaviour, while it is the informal trust based relations that create 
the system of mutually beneficial cooperation (Farrell and Knight 2003). Other studies show 
that informal and formal efficient institutions can be functional substitutes (Ahlerup, Olsson, 
and Yanagizawa 2008; Widmalm 2008). 
 
The difficult art of supplying efficient institutions 
  
The central claim from the NIE approach is that efficient formal institutions are necessary for 
creating economic efficiency and economic growth, especially in poverty stricken Third 
World countries (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Eggertsson 2005; Menard and 
Shirley 2005; North 2006; Rodrik 2007). It has also been claimed that such institutions 
explain the “miraculous” economic growth in Western Europe that started in the late 17th 
century (North 1990). While most scholars in the NIE approach concentrate on formal 
institutions, Douglass North has again and again emphasized the importance of the informal 
ones with concepts such as “shared mental models” and “norms of behavior, conventions, and 
internally imposed codes of conduct” (Denzau and North 1994; North 1998a; North 1998b; 
North 2006). 
 
The problem is often labelled as that of creating “credible commitments” between agents 
when they enter into contracts in a market (Keefer and Knack 2005). Without institutions that 
establish credible assurances that treacherous7 agents who renege on or violate contracts will 
be punished (or ostracised), so as to establish a general belief among most agents that such 
behaviour is uncommon, transaction costs will skyrocket and people will be disinclined to 
make productive investments. The result is that many otherwise profitable economic 
exchanges or investments will not come about because the agents will distrust one another to 
fulfil the contract. If dishonest and treacherous behaviour becomes what is generally expected 
(also known as “common knowledge”), almost all agents on the market will be losers and the 
market will not produce a socially efficient outcome. Such a situation is also known as a “sub-
optimal equilibrium” because it is self-reinforcing, as the existence of repeated and wide-
                                                 
7 Economists often use the term “opportunistic” to describe such behaviour, which I think is too nice a term for 
this type of agency  
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spread dishonest behaviour establishes mutual distrust (Bardhan 1997). Moreover, once 
generalized trust is broken, it becomes for a number of psychological reasons hard to mend. 
Because of this, agents can be “trapped” in a situation of mutual distrust. The efficiency that 
markets are supposed to generate is thus threatened by what has been called a “social trap” 
type of situation in which mutual distrust makes all agents worse off (Rothstein 2005). A 
social trap is a situation in which all agents know that they will all in the long run be better off 
if they all can be trusted to follow the rules emanating from the efficient institutions and thus 
compete on the market in an honest and fair way. However, this makes only sense if they can 
trust that (almost) all the other agents adhere to such a standard of behaviour. What is 
“rational” for the individual agent is thus not primarily given by any cost/benefit calculation 
over the transaction(s) as such, but instead by what the agents think about the other agents’ 
beliefs about the strategy/trustworthiness of all other agents, including herself. This type of 
rationality has been called “interactive rationality” by Robert Aumann and Jacques Dreeze. 
Seeing rationality in this social perspective has important implications because it shows the 
indeterminate nature of standard neoclassical theory and standard game theory that solely 
build on the idea that individuals will act so as to maximize their own pay-offs. The 
implication has been formulated by Aumann and Dreeze in the following way: 
 
if one is given only the abstract formulation of a game, one cannot 
reasonably hope for an expectation and optimal strategies. 
Somehow, the real-life context in which the game is played must 
be taken into account. The essential element in the notion of 
context is the mutual expectations of the players about the actions 
and expectations of the other players. (Aumann and Dreze 2005, p. 
9) 
 
Thus, the outcome of social and economic interactions depends on how the “real-life context” 
has constructed the “mutual expectations,” such as the expectations of whether the other 
agents can be trusted or not. In, sum, the argument is that this “real-life context” to a large 
extent consists of historically established and “often taken for granted” formal and informal 
institutions. Corruption and its related problems should thus according to this perspective not 
be seen as a “principal-agent” problem but a “collective action” type of problem (Rothstein 
2005; Teorell 2007).  
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For example, if institutions that would make treacherous behaviour the exception are lacking, 
market agents would come to believe that most other players can not be trusted in economic 
transactions. If such trust is lacking, it makes no sense to be the only honest player in a “rotten 
game”. Instead, it makes more sense to try to change the “efficient” institutions to become 
“redistributive” so that they will support the specific agents’ (or, more likely, group of 
agents’) position on the market. This can be done in numerous ways by means of corruption, 
secret price-negotiations, political lobbying, clientilistic networks, patrimonialism, organized 
crime, civil wars about the control of economic resources, and other sorts of violence. If a 
majority of the agents, because of the lack of trust in the honesty of the generalized “other 
agent”, act in these ways, the market will not deliver anything that can be expected to come 
even close to a socially efficient outcome. In sum, we face two interrelated problems. The 
first is that efficient institutions as they have been defined here are a genuine public good and, 
as with all such goods, they are collectively rational but it is in many cases irrational for the 
individual agent to contribute to them or respect them. As will be shown below, given 
standard assumptions about the operational logic of market agents, we can not assume that 
such institutions will be provided by them in any organic of functionalist way.  
 
Secondly, if efficient institutions have been established, we should expect market agents to try 
to change them to become redistributive. When it comes to formal institutions, they are likely 
to use various forms of lobbying to change the general rules (laws, regulations) so that they 
will be favoured at the expense of their competitors (Olson 1982).8 When it comes to the 
specific implementation of general rules, they are likely to use bribes or take part in other 
similar forms of corruption. One need only take a quick look at many of the different indexes 
of corruption that are provided by organizations such as Transparency International and the 
World Bank Research Institute to conclude that systemic or semi-systemic corruption is the 
rule around the world, not the exception. As Shirley states: “The vast majority of humans 
today live in countries that have failed to create or sustain strong institutions to foster 
exchange and protect persons and property” (Shirley 2005, p. 612). Another example of 
means to destroy well-known efficient institutions is when powerful economic networks 
establish systems of organized collaboration with government agencies to further their 
                                                 
8 Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Prize in Economics to the memory of Alfred Nobel, recalls that when he was 
chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under former US President Bill Clinton, CEOs of major U.S. 
companies regularly came to his office stating their support for the free-market principle that governments 
should not interfere in the market. However, as a rule they told Stiglitz that their particular industry was a special 
case that needed strong support from the U.S. government (from Block 2007, p. 12).  
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specific interests against their competitors. Such networks, also known as neo-corporatist 
systems of exchange, have been, and are still, very common in many Western European 
countries (Lindvall and Sebring 2005; Streeck and Crouch 2006). One can add other forms for 
destroying universal/efficient institutions such a clientilistic networks (Roninger 2004), 
powerful political-industrial complexes (Hossein-zadeh 2006) or organized crime (Varese 
2001). In sum, as Douglass North has put it: “institutions are not necessarily or even usually 
created to be socially efficient” (North 1998a, p. 249). The earlier idea in economics that 
market agents would in a sort of functionalist trial-and-error fashion be able to create efficient 
institutions is simply not credible given the known historical record (Bendor and Swistak 
2004; North 1998b). 
 
 
 
The problem is failures in creating and sustaining markets, not market 
failures. 
 
This argument presented here is different from the standard “market failure” argument in neo-
classical economics which has a long history dating back to Adam Smith’s famous statement 
that "people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices" (cf. Cowen 1988; Smith 1776).  The standard “market failure” theory proposes that 
there are a number of specific situations or a certain type of goods for which markets can not 
attain social efficiency, such as when the goods have large costs that are not reflected in the 
price, when the consumption of the good is not exclusive, when the production of the good 
has large social benefits, or when information problems become too extensive. In such cases, 
most neo-classical economists argue that there is a need for some form of government 
intervention or regulation.9 The argument from neo-classical economics is thus that in general 
markets will create efficiency if left to themselves, but that there are a number of special or 
exceptional circumstances that call for external government intervention. In contrast, my 
argument is that also for “perfect market goods” with low externalities and when consumption 
is exclusive and information is (almost) free and perfect, market agents behaving like market 
                                                 
9 It should however be noted that many neo-classical economists also warn that the effects of such government 
intervention caould worsen the situation, see many of the chapters in Cowen & Crampton (2002) and in  
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agents can generally not be expected to generate efficiency because we have very little reason 
to believe that such agents will create the necessary type of what has been defined above as 
efficient institutions. This is slowly becoming clear from the NIE research program. For 
example, Avner Greif argues that such institutions exist only “in a few advanced 
contemporary countries and only in recent times” (Greif 2005. p. 737). The same argument 
has been put forward in a recent paper by Douglass North, Joseph Wallis and Barry Weingast 
with the immodest title “A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history” 
(North, Wallis, and Weingast 2006). As Acemoglu and Robinson recently have put it: “An 
agreement on the efficient set of institutions is often not forthcoming because... groups with 
political power cannot commit to not using their power to change the distribution of resources 
in their favour” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). 
 
Why can market agents not be expected to create the efficient institutions that they need in order 
to create an efficient market?10 North states the problem as follows: "Neoclassical theory is 
simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce development. It is 
concerned with markets, not with how markets develop" (North 1998a, p. 247). One problem is 
that if political leaders successfully create a state that is administratively strong enough to protect 
property rights, they will also have access to an administrative machine that can violate those 
rights (North 1990, p. 59). If those in control of the state are the type of actors assumed by the 
utility maximizing model, they will also exploit that power to enrich themselves at the expense 
of the people’s rights (Weingast 1993, p. 287). As the situation in the many “failed states” in 
Africa has been described by Robert Bates: “The civil service assumes the role of a specialist in 
violence, using its command over the bureaucracy to redistribute income from the citizens to 
themselves” (Bates 2008, p 29). In so doing, they inevitably create distrust of the state as an 
institution, which is a barrier to the willingness to invest or take other economic risks. A second 
problem has its background in the fact that creating efficient institutions is a large, complicated 
and costly enterprise. As Hernando de Soto has shown, it took centuries for the efficient type of 
institutions upon which modern Western market economies are based to emerge (De Soto 2000). 
The jurisprudential regulations are complicated; the institutions required are many, costly and 
comprehensive (Greif 2005). It is not solely a matter of police and public courts, but also of 
institutions like registrar offices that establish ownership rights to real property, a working land 
                                                 
10 Cowen (1988) entails a number of chapters describing cases when economic agents have been able to 
overcome the collective action problem and produce public goods. The cases are all interesting but they are clear 
cases of exceptions bordering on the anecdotal. This is large “make believe” economics.  
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survey office, receivers, official agencies for the collection of debts, taxation and numerous 
inspection authorities, etc.  Precisely because it is a large and costly enterprise, the creation and 
reproduction of such institutions must be seen as a classic collective action problem and, as such, 
it is impregnated with all sorts of free-riding problems (Sened 1997). In addition, there is ample 
empirical support for the claim that even if such institutions are created, individual market agents 
have strong reasons to try to bend them to become redistributive so to work in their favour 
(Bennich-Björkman 2002; Malaquias 2007; Olson 1982). These three problems - the strong state 
problem and the two collective action problems - should be seen as the general rule for what to 
expect. There are however, as is well known, exceptions. Research on neo-corporatism shows 
that in some cases, market agents (for example employers’ federations, trade unions or trade 
organizations) have been able to establish efficient types of institutions through negotiations.  It 
should be noted that in almost all cases, this has been carried out either in close collaboration 
with government agents or in the shadow of a threat form government agents that if the market 
agents can not establish such efficient institutions through some form of compromise, the 
government would step in (Katzenstein 1994; Lewin 1992; Rothstein 1992a; Scharpf 1997).  
 
The other main exception from the general rule that market agents are generally unable to create 
efficient institutions is the work on “common pool resource problems” by Elinor Ostrom. She 
has shown that groups of economic agents who are all dependent on a local natural resource can 
create (efficient) institutions that prevent free-riding types of extraction that would be 
detrimental to the sustainability of the resource in question. Finding out that economic agents, if 
left to themselves without government interference, can overcome the famous “tragedy of the 
commons” problem is a major achievement and her research has rightfully gained a lot of 
attention (Ostrom 1990). Other studies, for example of water control systems, have confirmed 
her results (Kaijser 2002).  
  
However, there are a number of arguments for why her findings are not generalizable to modern 
competitive markets. First, in all her cases, the group in question has developed strong social 
bonds and mutual trust over a very long time. Second, the groups are socially and ethnically 
homogeneous, something that other scholars have put forward as critical. For example, a recent 
paper reviewing the literature concludes that “the negative association between ethnic 
heterogeneity and public goods provision is widely accepted” (Habyarimana et al. 2006). Other 
scholars contend that the negative relation between ethnic heterogeneity and public goods 
production is “one of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy” (Banerjee, 
 15
Somanathan, and Iyer 2005). They add that this is not only the case in such obvious and extreme 
cases like civil wars, but also under “normal” times.  Third, success depends on the opportunity 
for the group to enforce strict rules about who has the right to use the resource in question, which 
implies that a cartel-like situation already exists. Fourth, she reports a number of cases where 
such local regulations have failed due to a number reasons, most of them related to the failure of 
the agents to enter into what should be called a deliberative democratic process. Lastly, while the 
state is far away, it seems to be present in the shadow. For example, in her famous case about 
water regulation in Southern California, it is government institutions that provide the forum for 
discussions and decisions. In her conclusion, Ostrom states that “most of the institutional 
arrangements used in the success stories were rich mixtures of public and private 
instrumentalities” (Ostrom 1990, p. 182). 
 
Another well known case dealing with the problem of producing efficient institutions has 
been examined by Paul Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry Weingast in an oft-quoted 
paper (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990). Their example illuminates how merchants of a 
certain region in 14th century Europe could develop legal praxis that greased the wheels of 
trade despite the lack of credible state institutions. The problem they were facing was that of 
managing situations in which contractual disputes arose between two merchants, i.e., how 
they should handle the deceptive behavior of certain merchants in terms of various kinds of 
breach of contract. The situation may be likened to a classic social trap – all merchants have a 
vested interest in everyone behaving honestly, but there is no point in being the only honest 
actor if everyone else is engaged in trickery and deceit of one kind or another. If “everyone 
does it,” the financial gains to be had from trade decline substantially, in part because fewer 
transactions are completed and in part because the actors are forced to devote considerable 
resources to protecting themselves from the deceptive actions of others.  The costs incurred by 
merchant A to enter into a financial contract with merchant B, who intends to swindle A, are 
substantial. Even if the wronged A spreads information that the dishonest merchant B is not to 
be trusted, B could of course counter that information with contrary disclosures. Absent 
credible information institutions, other merchants have little or no means of determining who 
is in the right. 
      
Milgrom et. al. claim that the merchants’ guilds of 14th century France appointed “law 
merchants.” The law merchants were empowered to act as judges in disputes between 
merchants and to publicize information about merchants that refused to voluntarily accept the 
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verdicts of their deliberations (e.g., by paying compensation to the wronged party). This made 
deceptive behavior and refusal to comply with the verdicts of the law merchants an expensive 
business, since merchants who did so gained a reputation for lacking credibility and for being 
unreliable trading partners. This led to a strong decline in deceptive behavior, because it was 
in the merchants’ own interest to avoid getting such a reputation (see chapter five: in these 
contexts, the appearance of credibility is a vital asset). Therewith, according to Milgrom et al, 
an institution for solving the problem of the social trap had blossomed from the market’s own 
inherent logic. The actors have a self interest both in establishing the institution and in 
obeying the verdicts of the law merchants, which made the institution as such self-reinforcing. 
According to this analysis, a type of society under the rule of law had sprung up by itself; the 
problem of the social trap had been resolved by the self-interested utility maximizing actors of 
their own volition and with no outside involvement by something like a state or some form of 
social norms.  
     
This is a neat and very appealing analysis to be sure, but also supremely idealistic, if not to say 
naïve. Merchants and trading companies are not homogeneous quantities. Market logic dictates 
that some will eventually become much more financially strong than others. If they are economic 
rationalists, the large trading houses will use their financial strength to bribe or corrupt the law 
merchants in one way or another to gain economic advantages. They will also try to get their 
confidants in corruption installed in those positions in order to render verdicts in their own 
trading house’s favor. And if the law merchants are also economic rationalists, their integrity 
will be for sale as long as the price is right and the transaction can be kept secret. Secret 
interactions are the hallmark of corruption. Such a scenario is a rather apt description of events in 
Russia after the privatizations of the 1990s. The economic oligarchs seem to have become so 
strong that they have managed to buy attempts to build universal legal institutions out of 
existence (Hedlund 1999; Ledeneva 2006). 
 
As I have shown elsewhere, when well-known scholars in this tradition try to solve the problem 
of how efficient institutions can be created, they introduce a number of non-economic 
explanations such as “beliefs”, “norms”, “legitimacy”, altruistic actors”, etc (Rothstein 2005, ch. 
6). This may very well be true, but in light of their utility-based rationalistic models, these are all 
ad-hoc explanations and are thereby outside the reach of their theory. As Lichbach (1997) as well 
as Falachetti and Miller have shown, within the rationalistic paradigm “there is no solution” to 
the problem of creating efficient institutions (Falaschetti and Miller 2001).  
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An alternative and in many ways more promising approach to the problem of markets and 
institutions can be found in the economic sociology literature. The main claim from this 
approach is that markets are always socially embedded. (Block 2007; Dobbin 2004). This 
approach entails a very relevant critique of the neo-classical models of how markets operate 
since it shows that markets are almost never based on a pure utility-maximizing logic but depend 
on historically established and often “taken for granted” formal and informal institutions that can 
vary a lot between different settings (Fligstein and Dauter 2007). A part of this literature is 
inspired by Karl Polanyi’s theoretical framework developed in his well-known book “The Great 
Transformation” published in 1944. Central to Polanyi’s claim is also a strong critique of the 
idea of the possibility of a “self-adjusting market” (cited inBlock 2007, p.5).11  However, the 
problem with this approach - within the context of this discussion - is that there is no such thing 
as “efficient” institutions in economic sociology, only different types of what here has been 
labeled redistributive institutions (Block 2007). Second, the concept of embeddedness lacks 
precision, since it can be almost anything that surrounds a market. Third, the approach is not well 
suited to handle variations across time and space since it does not entail a well specified theory 
of why embeddedness differs. 
 
The same critique can be launched against Sened’s otherwise very informative work on the 
political institutions of private property, which talks very little about why the ability of political 
leaders to invest in “the design of legal codes that endow their citizens with the necessary 
framework for a productive life” vary so much across time and space (Sened 1997, p. 179).12 
 
 
The science of politics versus the science of economics and the problem of the 
supply of efficient institutions  
 
During my first year as a PhD student, I remember attending a seminar where one of the then 
most influential Swedish professors in Political Science, the late Jörgen Westerståhl, presented a 
new undergraduate level textbook with the title “The Swedish Democracy” (Birgersson and 
                                                 
11 Polanyi is not always clear and easy to interpret. My understanding is that he sees markets as exogenously 
self-destructive, that is, they will if not properly embedded destroy their external conditions.  Understood in this 
way, he differs from the argument presented here which is that markets are also endogenously self-destructive. 
12 According to Sened, some leaders are “smart” to make such long-term investments while others are ”greedy” 
and short sighted. It would be interesting to have a theory that explains this difference.  
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Westerståhl 1979). His presentation (and the book) was heavily criticized by the then “young 
turks” in the profession, for giving a far too rosy picture of how the Swedish democracy actually 
worked. In a very elegant way, Westerståhl managed to effectively silence his opponents by 
arguing that the intention with the book was not to give a realistic picture of how the system 
worked, but instead of how it was intended to work according to the new Swedish constitution 
(which he had been instrumental in drawing up). Westerståhl’s eloquence did in my opinion 
shield the fact that he in the book never made this distinction clear. I am retelling this to show 
that it has not been uncommon in Political Science to distort the political reality with idealistic 
pictures of how the state works. However, since then, the discipline has changed dramatically 
and I think it is fair to say that the normatively negative sides of how even well-established 
democratic systems operate have come to the forefront in teaching as well as in research. One 
example is how far from the ideals in the theory of representative democratic theory that actual 
representative parliamentarian democratic systems work even in well-established democracies 
such as Sweden and Norway (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Østerud and Selle 2006). Another 
example is the research about policy implementation, which shows the many difficulties in 
getting the policy intentions of the legislatures realized by the government authorities (O'Toole 
2004; Saetren 2005). A third example is research on the not-so-democratic influence of powerful 
interest groups (Katzenstein 1985; Lewin 1992). I think it is fair to say that most political science 
research nowadays eschews the romantic and idealistic view of the democratic process that 
Westerståhl’s textbook from 1979 represented. 
 
It should be underlined that while political scientists have put quite some effort in analyzing 
government failures, the public choice approach, in which politicians and civil servants were 
assumed to operate from the same narrow self-interest as market agents, was refuted by most 
political scientists and public administration scholars. In my opinion, this refutation came not so 
much from ideological reasons but instead because empirical research could not confirm the 
hypothesis (Brehm and Gates 1997; Dunleavy 1991). It should however be added that while 
most scholars in public administration and implementation research were interested in various 
dysfunctional tendencies of the political-administrative process, corruption-related problems 
have for the most part been outside their agenda, at least as long as their studies have been 
related to the developed Western democracies (Johnston 2006, p. 809). In addition, in the 
important approach known as the “Variety of Capitalism,” that has emanated within Political 
Science, this problem is not dealt with, probably since the difference between redistributive and 
efficient institutions is not recognized. In principle, all institutions in this approach are the 
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outcome of differences in social or economic power and thus redistributive (Hall and Soskice 
2001). 
 
In comparison to political science and sociology, I believe that economics in general, since 
the fall of the Keynesian paradigm in the 1970s, have been engaged in what can be described 
as an ideologically driven “love affair” with the market. The most problematic in this is that 
the supply and reproduction of efficient type institutions, which according to the NIE 
approach are necessary for market efficiency,  have either been taken for granted or not 
problematized at all. For example, standard and widely used major textbooks in (macro) 
economics do not deal with the possibilities of corrupt, clientilistic or similar forms of 
behavior by market agents. In fact, such problems (e.g., corruption) do not even have an index 
entry in these books even if they have titles such as “Law and Economics” (Cooter and Ulen 
2007), “Markets and Politics”  (Hultkrantz, Söderström, and Bergman 2007), “Applied 
Macroeconomics” (Persson and Skult 2005), “International Economics” (Appleyard, Cobb, 
and Field 2008), Macroeconomics: Theory, Politics and Institutions (Fregert and Jonung 
2005).  If corruption, clientilism and other forms of destruction of efficient types of 
institutions by powerful economic interest groups are at all described, it is only as a warning 
against the use of government regulation as a response to the standard type of market failures 
(Romer 2005, p. 146). The assumption behind this seems very unrealistic, namely that market 
agents “by nature” are interested in upholding efficient institutions, while only 
political/government agents have incentives to block the establishment of, or an inclination to 
hinder or destroy, such institutions. The old idea that “it takes two to tango” seems not to have 
penetrated this literature. In short, the important insights from institutional economics seem to 
have had very little impact in the study of general economics as it is taught in standard 
education at a typical business school.  
 
The results that come out from economic theory and the research about how to minimize 
corruption also seem to be contradictory. On the one hand, there are well-known economists, 
such as Alberto Alesina, who concludes that “a large government increases corruption and 
rent-seeking" (Alesina and Angeletos 2005, p. 18). An equally well-known and respected 
economist, Timothy Besley, states in a recent book that; 
 
There is a section of opinion that equates good government to small 
government. Moreover, this has been a dominant tradition in political 
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economy in the past. However, there is nothing in modern political 
economics to support this claim (Besley 2007b, p. 233).  
 
This type of contradictions from leading scholars in the social sciences on a crucial topic like 
this is, to put it mildly, not very reassuring (cf. La Porta et al. 1999).  It should be added, as 
stated above, that there is very little research in economics about how efficient institutions 
can be established. This holds also for what is known as “political economy”. For example, 
in the recently published “Handbook of Political Economy”, North criticises that none of the 
sixty-seven(!) chapters deals with the problem of how to establish efficient institutions. 
(North 2006).  
 
Standard textbooks in economics regularly refer back to Adam Smith’s famous “invisible 
hand” theory from his “Wealth of Nations” as an argument for why markets if left to 
themselves will become efficient. However, thirteen years before the publication of “Wealth 
of Nations”, Adam Smith published another book titled “A Theory of Moral Sentiments”, 
which is a work that put strong emphasis on things like virtues, self-restraint, and also on the 
role of proper government regulations. There is now a large literature in the “history of 
ideas” field that shows that these books should be seen as a unified theory that can be viewed 
as supporting the idea that markets can only be efficient if embedded in what here has been 
conceptualized as (formal and informal) institutions (Brown 1994; Darwall 1999; Griswold 
1999; Werhane 1994). What comes out from this research approach is that it is only from a 
superficial understanding of Adam Smith that he can be used for the argument that markets 
endogenously can generate economic efficiency.   
 
Another plausible reason for why mainstream economics has a problem with the questions of 
supply and reproduction of efficient institutions may come from the relatively strong position 
of the “public choice” approach within the discipline. The argument looks as follows: Agents 
operating efficient institutions must operate according to a core value (or basic norm) which I 
(together with Jan Teorell) in a recent paper have identified as impartiality (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008). For example, if agents competing in a market are to trust the institutions that 
are there to uphold the rule of law in order to handle conflicts about contracts, property rights 
and security, etc., the personnel that operate these institutions have to be seen as impartial 
between the conflicting parties. However, if these agents are solely motivated by furthering 
their material interests as the public choice approach takes as its starting point, their 
 21
impartiality will eventually be corrupted by one of the parties in the conflict if the money is 
good enough. This problem can not be handled according to the “principal-agent” theory by 
employing incentives or control from above, since this will only create a “second order” 
collective action problem because the agents at the top are likely to get most rents from such 
rent-seeking behaviour by agents that operate further down the system (Ostrom 1998). Thus, 
the idea that agents who operate efficient institutions, in order to be seen as trustworthy, have 
to act according to the ideal of impartiality instead of self-interest is difficult to handle, in 
particular within the public choice approach but apparently also in mainstream economics. It 
is noteworthy that economists that carry out empirical research in this area emphasize the 
need for a strong public interest orientation for public employees (Besley and Ghatak 2007; 
Collier 2007; Miller and Hammond 1994).     
 
 
 
A Concluding Illustrative Story 
 
The ever so popular HBO TV show “The Sopranos” contains a scene that speaks to the 
problem of the supply of efficient institutions. In a state of rage, the mob leader himself, 
Tony Soprano, with a gun in his hand goes after a low level gang member that has betrayed 
him and kills him. Usually, he would of course have used an underling for an operation like 
this, but this time (due to his mental instability that is a central theme of the series) he is so 
overtaken by emotions that he forgets the golden rule that mafia bosses should never do any 
of the dirty work themselves. As it happens, he is seen by an “ordinary citizen” chasing after 
the victim. This eyewitness goes to the police, not knowing that it is the local mafia leader 
that he has seen. The “ordinary Joe” tells the police that he is just sick and tired of all the 
violence in his neighbourhood and that he as a law-abiding citizen wants to help the police to 
clean up the neighbourhood. When the police commissars show him a bunch of photos of 
known criminals, he directly identifies the perpetrator - still not knowing who the person he 
identifies is. After he has left the police station, the police commissars are in a state of joy 
since they now seem to have what they need to put Tony Soprano behind bars. In the next 
scene, the eye-witness is sitting comfortably in what seems to be a middle-class home 
listening to classical music. A woman his age, probably his wife, is sitting close to him 
reading the newspaper. Suddenly she starts screaming and then shouts at him to read an 
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article in the paper. The article makes it clear to this honest and law-abiding citizen that the 
person he has identified at the police station as the perpetrator is the well-known local mafia 
leader Tony Soprano. The law-abiding citizen then throws himself at the phone, calls the 
police commissar who’s direct number he has, and in a terrified voice says that he did not see 
anything and that he will not become a witness. The interesting thing is the book our law-
abiding citizen was reading before his wife showed him the newspaper article. An observant 
spectator has about one second to see that it is the philosopher Robert Nozick’s modern 
classic Anarchy, State and Utopia - an icon for all ultraliberal, anti-government and free-
market proponents ever since it was published (Nozick 1974). The message from the people 
behind the Sopranos show seems clear: In a “stateless” Robert Nozick type of society, where 
everything should be arranged by individual, freely entered contracts, markets will 
deteriorate into organized crime. The conclusion is again, that there can be a market for 
anything as long as there is not a market for everything. Or in other words, if everything is 
for sale, markets will not come close to what should count as social efficiency.      
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